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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
         Ralph Anderskow and Donald Anchors appeal from judgments 
of conviction and sentence entered by the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey.  The convictions arise out of their 
participation, along with several other coconspirators, in the 
Euro-American Money Fund Trust (the "Trust"), an entity that was 
used to perpetrate a pernicious advance-fee scheme.  Over a three- 
year period, the Trust bilked unsuspecting loan applicants and 
investors out of over eighteen million dollars.  Both defendants 
raise evidentiary and legal sufficiency challenges.  We will affirm 
the judgments of conviction. 
                                I. 
         John Voigt was the mastermind of a scheme to obtain fees 
from loan applicants and potential investors for nonexistent loans 
and investments.  At the heart of this scheme was the Trust.  Voigt 
fabricated a fictitious genealogy for the Trust, claiming that it 
was a long-established European financial institution affiliated 
with the Catholic Church and the Knights of Malta, and that it had 
access to billions of dollars.  For two and one-half years brokers 
for the Trust would recount this false genealogy to unsuspecting 
loan applicants and investors, who would part with substantial fees 
in return for "self-liquidating" loans (loans that repaid 
themselves) and "Master Collateral Commitments" ("MCCs"), allegedly 
a special form of commercial paper available only to banks. 
         Voigt benefitted from the cooperation of several 
coconspirators, including Anderskow, a partner at a Chicago law 
firm who also was a certified public accountant.  He was hired as 
the Trust's lawyer in the Chicago area, and his credentials helped 
provide the Trust with an appearance of legitimacy, which 
facilitated its attempts to lure loan applicants and potential 
investors.  Anderskow's primary responsibility was providing 
guarantees to borrowers on behalf of the Trust and maintaining a 
client escrow account into which advance fees were deposited.  
Anderskow would immediately distribute fees that had been deposited 
into his escrow account according to Voigt's instructions, which 
violated the terms of contracts entered into with the loan 
applicants and investors.  For his role in the Trust Anderskow 
received $995,000 in compensation. 
         In January of 1991 appellant Anchors was hired for the 
position of "loan oversight officer."  Somewhat akin to a customer 
relations manager, Anchors was primarily responsible for responding 
to questions and complaints from customers of the Trust.  Over 
time, Anchors devoted much of his time to placating loan applicants 
who had paid advance fees and were calling with increasing 
frequency to inquire as to the status of their loans.  Anchors 
eventually responded to several hundred calls each month, assuring 
disgruntled borrowers that their loans were about to be funded.  
Eventually, Anchors began to tell some applicants that other loans 
had been funded, which he knew was untrue.  Anchors received 
$325,000 for his participation in the Trust. 
         In June of 1993, a federal grand jury issued a twenty- 
six-count indictment against Anderskow, Anchors, and their three 
coconspirators--Voigt, Mercedes Travis, and Solis Alevy.  Alevy 
entered a plea of guilty and became a government witness.  
Subsequently, the grand jury issued a twenty-eight-count 
superseding indictment against the remaining four defendants, 
charging Anderskow and Anchors with conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering, and bringing criminal 
money laundering forfeiture allegations against them. 
         After a three-month trial, a jury convicted Anderskow on 
all charges except two counts of wire fraud.  Anchors was convicted 
of conspiracy and seven counts of wire fraud, but was acquitted of 
seven other counts of wire fraud and two counts of money 
laundering.  Anderskow and Anchors were sentenced, respectively, 
to terms of imprisonment of seventy-eight and thirty-two months.  
This appeal followed. 
                               II. 
         The district court had original jurisdiction over these 
criminal actions pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  3231.  We exercise 
appellate jurisdiction to review final judgments of conviction 
under 28 U.S.C.  1291. 
                               III. 
         Both Anderskow and Anchors contest the district court's 
decision to allow coconspirator Alevy, who pled guilty prior to 
trial and testified for the government, to give lay opinion 
testimony under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Alevy's 
testimony tended to show that Anderskow and Anchors had knowledge 
of the Trust's fraudulent scheme.  Contending that Alevy's 
allegedly improper testimony provided the government with its only 
evidence concerning their knowledge that the Trust was a fraud, 
both defendants claim that this alleged error was so prejudicial as 
to warrant a new trial.  We disagree. 
         A.   Anderskow 
                                1. 
         During its case in chief, the government called Alevy to 
testify about the workings of the Trust and its various components.  
Specifically, Alevy was asked to explain why in late 1991 he had 
drafted letters containing false information for Anderskow to sign 
and send to a victim of the Trust who had paid a substantial 
advance fee for an MCC, and was becoming angry at not having 
received it.  Anderskow assigns error to the following exchanges 
between the government and Alevy: 
         Q.   How is it that you, on the one hand, passed false 
              information to Mr. Anderskow but did not intend to 
              deceive him? 
 
         A.   Mr. Anderskow was a daily participant in the same 
              fraud that I was.  I can't get into his mind, I 
              have no way of knowing what he knew inside his 
              mind, but it was obvious to me and told to me by 
              Mr. Voigt that [Anderskow] will do anything we ask 
              him to. 
 
              . . . 
 
         Q.   When you passed on that false information to Mr. 
              Anderskow, did you do it to deceive him? 
 
         A.   No, sir. 
 
         Q.   Why then did you pass on information if it wasn't 
              true? 
 
         A.   It was part of the job I was doing, and he was 
              doing the part of the job that he was doing, and 
              some information was necessary for his part. 
 
              . . . 
 
         Q.   Did you ever directly or specifically discuss this 
              fraud with Mr. Anderskow? 
 
         A.   No, sir. 
 
         Q.   Why not? 
 
         A.   There was no reason to.  We were both doing the 
              same thing for the same ends every day. 
 
App. at 1786, 1799. 
 
                                2. 
 
         Anderskow's complaint is twofold.  First, he claims that 
Alevy lacked sufficient personal knowledge to form an opinion as to 
whether Anderskow knew the Trust was a fraud and, therefore, that 
Alevy's testimony failed to meet Rule 701(a)'s "rational basis" 
requirement as a matter of law.  Second, Anderskow appears to argue 
that even if Alevy's opinion was rationally based on his 
perceptions, to the extent it suggested that Anderskow had guilty 
knowledge it was tantamount to an opinion on the ultimate issue of 
Anderskow's guilt.  Alevy's opinion testimony, according to 
Anderskow, failed to meet Rule 701(b)'s "helpfulness" requirement 
as a matter of law. 
         We normally review alleged evidentiary errors for abuse 
of discretion.  Government of Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 
619, 629 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 556 (1993); Eisenberg 
v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 780 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946, 
106 S. Ct. 346 (1985).  Anderskow, however, failed to object 
contemporaneously to any of the testimony about which he now 
complains.  As a result, we review his contention for "'plain 
error,' that is, 'egregious error or a manifest miscarriage of 
justice.'"  United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526, 530 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(quoting United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 928, 109 S. Ct. 314 (1988)).  See Fed. R. Crim. P.52(b). 
         We find no plain error because none of the disputed 
testimony actually contains a "lay opinion" by Alevy as to 
Anderskow's knowledge.  Although it is readily apparent that in 
questioning why Anderskow would know that the information in the 
letters was false the government was attempting to elicit an 
opinion from Alevy, he never explicitly opined on direct 
examination that Anderskow possessed guilty knowledge.  Instead, 
Alevy provided several reasons to support the unstated conclusion 
that Anderskow had guilty knowledge.  For instance, Alevy testified 
that he did not believe that Anderskow would be deceived since 
Anderskow and Alevy were part of the same organization working 
toward a common goal, and because Voigt had told him that Anderskow 
would do anything they asked.  This simply furnished the basis for 
an inference, based on circumstantial evidence, that Anderskow had 
guilty knowledge which the government was free to suggest during 
its closing argument and which the jury was free to accept or 
reject.  Accordingly, since Alevy's testimony did not implicate 
Rule 701, there clearly was no plain error in its admission. 
         B.   Anchors 
         Anchors advances a similar claim with respect to Alevy's 
testimony.  Because Anchors preserved this claim for appellate 
review by raising a contemporaneous objection, we review the 
admission of Alevy's opinion testimony under Rule 701 for abuse of 
discretion.  Knight, 989 F.2d at 629; Eisenberg, 766 F.2d at 780. 
                                1. 
         During its case in chief, the government questioned Alevy 
about certain documents he had sent to Anchors to be passed along 
to borrowers who had paid advance fees and were becoming angry at 
not having seen any results.  Anchors assigns error to the 
following exchanges between the government and Alevy: 
         Q.   Now, when you were providing this information 
              concerning schedules and projects to Mr. Anchors, 
              did you intend to deceive him by that information? 
 
         A.   No, sir. 
 
         Q.   How so? 
 
         A.   I was doing my job, he was doing his job. 
 
         Q.   Did you believe that Donald Anchors would be 
              deceived by the information that you were sending 
              him? 
 
              . . . 
 
         A.   Personally, I did not believe that. 
 
         Q.   Why not? 
 
         A.   Donald Anchors had probably 20 or 30 borrowers, 
              maybe more for all I know, who had been promised 
              millions of dollars for a long time, some as long 
              as a year.  He had never seen one dime funded or 
              loaned, and he kept on with the business at hand.  
              I had no reason to believe that he wasn't fully 
              aware of what was occurring, as long as he was 
              getting paid. 
 
         Q.   Did you ever specifically discuss fraud, the fraud 
              in which you believed you were involved with Donald 
              Anchors? 
 
         A.   No, sir. 
 
         Q.   Why not? 
 
         A.   There was no reason to discuss this, we were doing 
              it. 
 
App. at 503-04. 
 
                                2. 
 
         Anchors first complains that he had insufficient contact 
with Alevy for his opinion to be "rationally based" on his 
perceptions.  We disagree.  We have held that lay opinion testimony 
can be based upon a witness' "knowledge and participation in the 
day-to-day affairs of his business," Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco 
Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1175 (3d Cir. 1993), and upon a witness' review 
of written documents.  United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 193 (3d 
Cir. 1991); Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 
403-04 (3d Cir. 1980).  Alevy's testimony revealed that he had 
contact with Anchors by telephone and via facsimile on a weekly 
basis in the fall of 1991.  Most of this correspondence concerned 
loan schedules that had been promised to borrowers.  In explaining 
the workings of the Trust and the roles of its various members, 
Alevy testified that he would provide schedules containing false 
information to Anchors so that he could pass them along to the 
borrowers.  We think that in light of the weekly correspondence by 
telephone and facsimile between Alevy and Anchors, Alevy had 
sufficient first-hand knowledge such that his opinion was 
"rationally based" on his perceptions.  Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 
F.3d at 1175; Leo, 941 F.2d at 193; Teen-Ed, Inc., 620 F.2d at 403- 
04. 
         Although we conclude that Alevy's testimony was 
"rationally based" on his perception of Anchors, we conclude that 
Alevy's subjective belief that Anchors "must have known" fails to 
meet Rule 701(b)'s "helpfulness" requirement.  Anchors' principal 
contention is that the reasons supporting Alevy's opinion as to why 
Anchors would not be deceived were already before the jury.  Since 
it was for the jury to determine whether he "must have known" that 
the Trust was engaged in a large-scale fraud, Alevy's opinion on 
the subject, according to Anchors, essentially turned him into a 
thirteenth juror.  We agree. 
         In United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1992), 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that where the 
jury has before it the same circumstantial evidence of a 
defendant's criminal knowledge on which a witness bases an opinion 
concerning a defendant's knowledge, testimony from a witness 
concluding that the defendant "had to know" usually will not meet 
Rule 701(b)'s helpfulness requirement: 
         [W]hen a witness has fully described what a 
         defendant was in a position to observe, what 
         the defendant was told, and what the defendant 
         said or did, the witness's opinion as to the 
         defendant's knowledge will often not be 
         "helpful" within the meaning of Rule 701 
         because the jury will be in as good a position 
         as the witness to draw the inference as to 
         whether or not the defendant knew. 
 
Id. at 1216 (internal citations omitted).  The Rea court found that 
testimony by a witness that the defendant "had to know" failed to 
meet Rule 701's helpfulness requirement, but went on to conclude 
that the error was harmless. 
         In this case, Alevy testified about the number of 
complaints Anchors was receiving from customers; Anchors' response 
to those complaints; and the sheer passage of time during which 
Anchors saw no loans funded.  That Alevy "had no reason to believe 
that [Anchors] wasn't fully aware of what was occurring, as long as 
he was getting paid," App. at 504, simply was not helpful to the 
jury's determination of Anchors' criminal knowledge.  The 
government suggests that because a coconspirator's subjective 
belief that a defendant "must have known" simply provides 
additional circumstantial evidence as to the defendant's objective 
mental state, it is helpful to the jury.  We are not persuaded.  We 
do not understand how a witness' subjective belief that a defendant 
"must have known" is helpful to a factfinder that has before it the 
very circumstantial evidence upon which the subjective opinion is 
based.  Furthermore, during its closing argument the government is 
free to ask the jury to draw the inference suggested by the 
circumstantial evidence: that the defendant must have known.  
Accordingly, our holding does nothing to hamper the government's 
ability to establish a defendant's criminal knowledge, even where 
members of a conspiracy never openly discuss their criminal 
activity. 
         Although we conclude that Alevy's opinion testimony fails 
to meet Rule 701(b)'s helpfulness requirement, its admission was 
harmless error.  As our opinion will demonstrate, see infra IV.B., 
the circumstantial evidence of Anchors' knowledge was overwhelming. 
Furthermore, the government did not rely on Alevy's testimony in 
its summation, stressing instead the mountain of circumstantial 
evidence supporting the inference that Anchors "must have known."  
Accordingly, there is no possibility that Alevy's opinion testimony 
to the same effect contributed to the verdict. 
                               IV. 
         At trial the government had no direct proof of a tacit 
agreement among Voigt, Alevy, Anderskow and Anchors to engage in an 
advance-fee scheme.  Accordingly, both defendants filed posttrial 
motions for judgments of acquittal contending that the government 
had failed to adduce sufficient evidence that they were knowing 
participants in a scheme to defraud potential borrowers and/or 
investors.  They appeal the district court's denial of those 
motions. 
         Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is 
"governed by strict principles of deference to a jury's findings," 
United States v. Ashfield, 735 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 858, 105 S. Ct. 189 (1984), such that we draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the jury verdict.  Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct 2781, 2789 (1979).  We will 
overturn a verdict only "if no reasonable juror could accept 
evidence as sufficient to support the conclusion of the defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  United States v. Coleman, 811 
F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Campbell, 
702 F.2d 262, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).  Consequently, a "claim of 
insufficiency places a very heavy burden on an appellant."  United 
States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting 
United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
457 U.S. 1125, 102 S. Ct. 2945 (1982)), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982, 
111 S. Ct. 1637 (1991). 
         A.   Anderskow 
         Anderskow was convicted on ten counts of money laundering 
arising out of various transfers of funds from his attorney escrow 
account to Trust members, pursuant to Voigt's instructions, between 
July and October of 1991.  He also was convicted on numerous counts 
of wire fraud relating to his actions during the same period.  
Anderskow claims that the evidence is legally insufficient to 
sustain those convictions because the government failed to prove 
that he knew the funds being transferred represented the proceeds 
of unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C.  1956(a)(1), or that the transfers 
were intended to promote "the carrying on of specified unlawful 
activity."  Id.  1956(a)(1)(A)(i).  He likewise contends that the 
evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that he was a knowing and 
willful participant in a scheme to defraud.  Id.  1343. Simply 
stated, Anderskow argues that the government failed to prove that 
he was a member of the conspiracy.  We disagree. 
         The crucial period with respect to Anderskow's legal 
sufficiency challenges is July of 1991, the start of his money 
laundering activity.  Anderskow's position on appeal is that he 
joined the Trust believing it to be a bona fide provider of funding 
services and that Voigt was a "legitimate, honest international 
financier."  Anderskow's Br. at 32.  He also points to Alevy's 
testimony that they never openly discussed the fraudulent nature of 
the Trust and the "steady stream of false and deceptive 
information" Alevy provided him to be passed on to the Trust's 
customers.  Id. at 34.  Anderskow argues that absent Alevy's 
improper opinion testimony as to his knowledge, the government 
produced insufficient evidence that he was a knowing and willful 
participant in an illegal venture between July and September of 
1991. 
         In rejecting Anderskow's argument, we begin our analysis 
by observing that at trial Anderskow asserted a good-faith defense 
to the fraud charges.  The government, therefore, sought and 
obtained from the district court a "willful blindness" instruction.  
The district court charged the jury that "[t]he element of 
knowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof that a 
defendant may have deliberately closed his or her eyes to what 
otherwise had been obvious to him or her."  App. at 4287-88.  We 
think that even if Anderskow were correct that the government 
failed to establish that he was aware of the Trust's fraudulent 
nature when he first joined in March of 1990, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the government, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 
319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789, the evidence more than adequately supports 
the jury's finding that he knew of the Trust's illegal activities 
by July of 1990 and, instead of withdrawing, continued as a willing 
participant in return for substantial remuneration. 
         As the government points out, the Trust Anderskow joined 
in March of 1990 had a "strong aura of unreality."  Government's 
Br. at 77.  It purported to sell "self-liquidating" loans; i.e., 
loans that did not have to be repaid.  It also claimed to be a 
long-established European financial institution affiliated with the 
Catholic Church and the Knights of Malta, and that it had access to 
billions of dollars.  Furthermore, loan applicants were required to 
sign bizarre confidentiality agreements that purported to bar 
customers from disclosing information about the Trust in this life 
and the hereafter.  Loan applicants also were required to fill out 
peculiar personal questionnaires that asked if they could hold 
their breath under water or were flat footed, and they were asked 
to provide hair samples and blood tests.  Given Anderskow's status 
as a partner in a Chicago law firm and a certified public 
accountant, and in light of his initial questioning of Trust 
brokers as to whether the money was "clean," a rational jury was 
entitled to find that Anderskow was suspicious from the outset.  
Furthermore, a rational jury could have accepted the government's 
argument that Anderskow's credentials provided the Trust with an 
appearance of legitimacy. 
         More significant, however, is that during 1990 no less 
than seventeen advance fees, which totaled $1.5 million, were 
deposited into Anderskow's escrow account.  Despite the fact that 
not one loan was funded during that time, Anderskow immediately 
would parcel out the money to the various coconspirators.  By July 
of 1991, moreover, seventeen additional borrowers and investors had 
paid Anderskow advance fees totaling $6.5 million dollars, which 
Anderskow disbursed to his confederates.  Anderskow himself 
testified that during 1991 he received approximately twelve 
complaints per day from anxious loan applicants and investors 
inquiring about their money.  Although he knew that not one loan or 
MCC had been funded, Anderskow continued to provide a plethora of 
false excuses intended to lull customers into believing that their 
money was forthcoming. 
         Even more damning was Anderskow's admission under cross- 
examination that by dividing up advance fees among the 
coconspirators, instead of retaining them in his escrow account, he 
knew in June of 1991 that he was violating his contractual and 
ethical duty to hold customers' funds until they had received their 
loans.  The evidence showed that Anderskow also lied to one 
borrower in the latter part of 1991, claiming that the Trust had 
funded loans in the past when, in fact, Anderskow knew that no such 
funding had occurred.  Finally, the evidence of Anderskow's 
financial motive and willingness to cooperate is not seriously 
debatable.  In 1990 Anderskow earned $100,000 from the Trust, and 
in 1991 he received $437,000, which was more than ten times greater 
than his 1989 income.  Anderskow mechanically complied with Voigt's 
directions as to how to disburse the advance fees in his escrow 
account among the various coconspirators. 
         The government presented an overwhelming circumstantial 
case that by July of 1991 Anderskow had willfully blinded himself 
to the Trust's fraudulent activities.  We have held that there must 
be evidence establishing a "'unity of purpose,' the intent to 
achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work together toward 
that goal."  United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 
1988).  See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 321 (3d Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 962, 113 S. Ct. 1388 (1993).  We have 
further held that "all of the elements of the government's case, 
including the existence of the agreement, may be proven entirely 
through circumstantial evidence."  United States v. Schramm, 75 
F.3d 156, 159 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Kapp, 781 
F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1024, 106 S. Ct. 
1220 (1986)).  Given Anderskow's lulling of disgruntled customers, 
his admitted knowledge that disbursing advance fees among the 
coconspirators violated both the Trust's contractual obligations 
and his ethical duties, and his financial motive, a rational jury 
could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderskow was 
a knowing and willing participant in a scheme to defraud by July of 
1991. 
         B.   Anchors 
         Anchors likewise contends that there is insufficient 
evidence of his knowing and willful participation in a scheme to 
defraud loan applicants.  The jury acquitted Anchors of counts 
three through six, but found him guilty of counts seven through ten 
and twelve through fourteen.  Accordingly, the jury found that 
Anchors had the requisite knowledge as of October 31, 1991, the 
date on which he faxed a letter on behalf of Anderskow.  Again, 
while the government's evidence of Anchors' knowledge was entirely 
circumstantial, we think it provides overwhelming proof that 
Anchors had willfully blinded himself to the fact that he was 
participating in a fraudulent scheme. 
         Anchors joined the Trust as a "loan officer" in January 
of 1991, with thirty years of experience in business, the last 
seven of which were as a loan officer.  From the moment he joined 
the Trust, Anchors was aware that there were loan applicants who 
had paid advance fees but had not received their loans.  According 
to his own testimony, Anchors fielded "between 70 and 80" calls in 
January of 1991 alone from concerned customers.  App. at 1203.  By 
February, merely one month into his employment, Anchors informed 
Voigt that he was using "every excuse in the world," id. at 1205, 
and he raised the possibility of liabilities flowing from the 
Trust's failure to fund the loans.  All the while, Anchors 
continued to provide excuses to angry customers, knowing that not 
a single loan had been funded.  Anchors testified that by May of 
1991 he was fielding approximately 250 calls per week. 
         Despite the fact that not one loan was funded, Anchors 
continued to assuage disgruntled applicants with excuse after 
excuse, responding to twenty calls per day from mid-July on.  
Furthermore, notwithstanding his attempts to downplay his 
significance to the Trust, Anchors clearly understood the 
importance of his role.  For instance, he wrote Voigt that 
"sometimes I amaze myself with [the customers'] resultant 
patience," and that "I feel as though I am the [T]rust to those 
borrowers under my care."  Id. at 181.  More significantly, by 
September and October of 1991, Anchors had affirmatively lied to 
one customer, falsely telling him that eight other loans had been 
funded, which provided strong circumstantial evidence of knowledge 
and intent.  At the same time, however, Anchors wrote to Alevy 
about the rising tide of customer complaints and asked for 
additional "creative" excuses that he could put in writing.  
Finally, Anchors' financial motive was beyond dispute.  Although he 
earned $25,000 in the year prior to joining the Trust, he received 
$200,000 during 1991, his first year with the Trust. 
         We think that when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the government, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct at 
2789, the circumstantial evidence of Anchors' knowledge and willful 
participation was overwhelming.  Pointing to Alevy's testimony that 
they never discussed the fraud in which they were engaged, Anchors' 
principal contention is that, absent Alevy's allegedly improper 
opinion testimony, the government failed to adduce any direct 
evidence of his knowledge of the conspiracy's illicit purpose.  As 
we noted earlier, however, "all of the elements of the government's 
case," including knowledge of the conspiracy's illicit purpose, 
"may be proven entirely through circumstantial evidence."  Schramm, 
75 F.3d at 156 (citing Kapp, 781 F.2d at 1010).  If Anchors' 
argument were taken at face value, the government could never prove 
the existence of a conspiracy where, as here, the coconspirators do 
not discuss the fraudulent nature of their actions.  United States 
v. Klein, 515 F.2d 751, 754 (3d Cir. 1975) ("Circumstantial 
evidence is clearly proper . . . especially in a conspiracy case 
where direct evidence is likely to be scant.") (footnote omitted).  
We refuse to so hold.  Ten months passed during which no loan was 
ever funded. Given the mounting complaints and Anchors' willingness 
to provide both creative and false excuses for the Trust's 
nonperformance, which was motivated by the opportunity for 
substantial financial remuneration, the jury had ample evidence 
with which to conclude that, at a minimum, Anchors had willfully 
blinded himself to the fact that the Trust was a fraud and that his 
actions were aiding its fraudulent purpose.  See United States v. 
Ruuska, 883 F.2d 262, 264 (3d Cir. 1989) (lulling defrauded victims 
with false excuses is circumstantial evidence of mens rea); United 
States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 958 (3d Cir. 1979) (anticipated 
remuneration circumstantial evidence of coconspirator's mens rea). 
         United States v. Klein, 515 F.2d at 751, cited by 
Anchors, is not to the contrary.  In Klein we set aside a 
defendant's convictions for mail fraud and conspiracy to commit 
mail fraud, which arose out of a scheme by owners of a "debt- 
ridden" hotel to set their hotel afire and then collect the 
proceeds of several fire insurance policies.  Id. at 752.  Klein 
was hired to destroy the hotel for $60,000.  After the hotel had 
been partially destroyed by fire, codefendant Luick was hired by 
another unindicted coconspirator to prepare and submit proofs of 
loss forms to the insurance companies.  We overturned Luick's 
convictions because submission of the proofs of loss forms alone 
failed to prove that he knew of the conspiracy's unlawful purpose.  
Although Luick had paid Klein a referral fee, and had done so in 
the past, we found it significant, if not dispositive, that "[i]t 
was not shown that . . . Luick should have been put on notice of 
suspicious facts in this case because of his past dealings with 
Klein.  In fact the nature of Klein's and Luick's past dealings was 
left wholly unexplained."  Id. at 755 (footnote omitted). 
         Here, by contrast, the relationship among Voigt, Alevy, 
Anderskow and Anchors was fully explored at trial.  It is true that 
Anchors joined a conspiracy that was already in progress.  But 
unlike the defendant in Klein, Anchors engaged in numerous 
activities over a substantial period of time in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.  While Klein stands for the unremarkable proposition 
that a latecomer to a conspiracy does not automatically acquire 
knowledge of the conspiracy's unlawful purpose simply by taking a 
one-time action ostensibly in furtherance of its purpose, surely 
Klein does not preclude a conviction where, as here, the defendant 
provides a steady stream of false excuses in the face of mounting 
complaints from disgruntled customers in return for substantial 
remuneration.  Klein is inapposite. 
                                V. 
         For the foregoing reasons the judgments of conviction and 
sentence will be affirmed in all respects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
